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A Social Norm Theory of Regulating
Housing Speech Under the Fair Housing Act
Stephanie M. Stern*

ABSTRACT
The Fair Housing Act’s prohibition of discriminatory housing statements
presents a puzzle. This provision regulates housing speech, such as advertisements and notices, more robustly than acts of housing discrimination (e.g., discriminatory refusals to rent or sell). It extends liability regardless of intent
and, unlike other provisions in the Fair Housing Act, does not exempt smallscale landlords from liability. Making discriminatory housing statements legally actionable also burdens commercial speech, diverts enforcement resources from discriminatory refusals to rent or sell, and gives rise to other,
often more costly, forms of communicating preferences in residential real estate transactions. Why accord such strong protection to regulation of housing
speech? This Article suggests an answer. A wealth of empirical research in
social psychology establishes that social norms are one of the most potent
methods of reducing prejudice. Our beliefs about what others think, particularly others who are similar to us or part of our group, shape the attitudes and
behaviors we express toward people of different races and other protected
classes under the Fair Housing Act. This Article assesses the Fair Housing
Act’s prohibition of discriminatory housing statements, as well as recent conflict between the Fair Housing Act and the Communications Decency Act and
debate about roommate advertisements, in light of the power of social norms.

INTRODUCTION
Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),1 which prohibits discriminatory housing advertisements and statements, compels some surprising
results. It regulates the content of commercial speech in the absence of an
accompanying or subsequent discriminatory act (e.g., refusal to sell or rent).2
For example, a landlord who advertises “no Jews” or “prefer no children” in a
newspaper advertisement has violated § 3604(c) even if he or she subsequently
rents to a Jewish person or family with young children.3 Oral statements that
indicate preference or discrimination, such as asking a potential buyer who
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Robert Schwemm, Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Chloe Morrison, Joshua Melson, Calvin Lai, Cherie Metcalf, Jonathan Nash, and the participants of the CLEA 2018 conference in Law & Economics for
their helpful comments.
1. 42 U.S.C § 3604(c) (2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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phones to inquire about a property if he or she is white, similarly violate
§ 3604(c).4
Section 3604(c) was controversial at its inception and remains so today.
Scholars have called the prohibition on discriminatory housing statements and
publications the FHA’s “most intriguing provision,” while critics have alleged
it infringes on freedom of speech, delivers minimal benefits, and entraps smallscale landlords or roommate seekers who are unaware of its prohibitions.5 Section 3604(c) presents puzzles that have tugged at housing policymakers and
scholars since the FHA’s inception. For example, the regulation of housing
statements and advertisements is more expansive than the FHA’s treatment of
discriminatory refusals to rent, sell, or lend. The major exemptions to liability
under the FHA do not apply to § 3604(c).6 In addition, unlike other anti-discrimination laws, § 3604(c) does not require that the defendant have discriminatory intent or, as discussed above, have committed a discriminatory act in a
real estate transaction.7 Why does § 3604(c) impose stricter liability regardless
of intent, with fewer exemptions, than the FHA provisions addressing actual
acts of housing discrimination? One wonders why the FHA, which scraped
through the legislative process amid controversy and resistance, ultimately included such a robust provision.8
Psychology research on social norms suggests some answers. Social
norms research reveals important reasons the FHA should regulate speech despite its costs – and why it should do so robustly and regardless of the speaker’s
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Bader v. Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cty, No. G041118, 2010 WL

740185 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2010) (discussing claims of a landlord who argued that
receiving a violation and fines for his ambiguous housing advertisement that small
apartment was well-suited to one or two professional adults constituted extortion and
was devoid of public benefit); David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the
First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 134–38 (2001) (describing free speech concerns
under the FHA and arguing that failures of political process impel protecting First
Amendment rights from antidiscrimination laws); Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 187, 187 (2001) (arguing that housing
statement regulation was an intriguing addition to the FHA); cf. Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV.
1125, 1152–53 (2010) (noting that most people advertising for roommates believe they
can lawfully advertise preferences based on characteristics such as gender, race, religion, etc.).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018) (clarifying that § 3604(c) applies to smallscale landlords and others otherwise exempted from the FHA); id. § 3607(a) (exemption for private clubs and religious organizations applies to discriminatory actions, not
statements). See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW
AND LITIGATION ch. 15 (2018).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (requiring only that the statement would “indicate”
such a discriminatory motivation to the listener). But see id. § 3604(a); id. §3604(b);
id. §3604(d) (requiring that the action occur “because of” a protected status).
8. See infra Part I.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/7

2

Stern: A Social Norm Theory of Regulating Housing Speech Under the Fair

2019]

A SOCIAL NORM THEORY OF REGULATING HOUSING

437

intent. Social norms refer to expectations for individual behavior or attitudes
derived from the norms of a group that the individual identifies with or values.9
These expectations define and reaffirm the identity and composition of the
group.10 Communications, both written and oral, are primary sources of information about the prevailing norms of the group.11 Statements and other forms
of communication affect listeners’ views of other groups and their behaviors
toward members of “outgroups.”12 What we believe others think about groups,
such as African-Americans, Christians, or obese individuals, is a primary determinant of our own prejudices.
A substantial body of empirical research shows that reducing the appearance of prejudiced attitudes or acts of discrimination can lessen the expression
of prejudiced attitudes and promote egalitarian behaviors in listeners.13 Specifically, statements that indicate a norm or consensus among a group or that
activate a pre-existing norm can shift the attitudes expressed by listeners in the
direction of that statement.14 Even highly prejudiced individuals report lower
levels of prejudice and more willingness for contact with members of other
groups after they learn that members of a group they identify with (e.g., fellow
9. See Rachel I. McDonald & Christian S. Crandall, Social Norms and Social
Influence, 3 CURRENT OPINION IN BEHAV. SCI. 147, 147 (2015) (“A social norm is an
expectation about appropriate behavior that occurs in a group context.”). Economists
and legal scholars have conceptualized norms somewhat more punitively, emphasizing
the role of norms in sanctioning individuals for non-conforming conduct. See, e.g.,
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1095, 1095–97 (1986).
10. See McDonald & Crandall, supra note 9, at 147–48.
11. Id.
12. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 367–68 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske &
Gardner Lindzey eds., 1998).
13. See, e.g., Margo J. Monteith, Nicole E. Deneen & Gregory D. Tooman, The
Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men
and Blacks, 18 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (2010); Elizabeth Levy Paluck,
Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in
Rwanda, 96 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574 (2009); Barbara Masser & Lisa
Phillips, “What Do Other People Think?” – The Role of Prejudice and Social Norms
in the Expression of Opinions Against Gay Men, 55 AUSTRALIAN J. OF PSYCHOL. 184
(2003); Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman & Laurie O’Brien, Social Norms and the
Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization, 82 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 359, 359 (2002) [hereinafter Crandall, Social Norms];
Charles A. Stangor, Gretchen B. Sechrist & John T. Jost, Changing Racial Beliefs by
Providing Consensus Information, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 486
(2001); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social
Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 993 (1994); Russell D. Clark III & Anne Maass, The Effects of Majority Size on Minority Influence, 20
EUROPEAN J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 99 (1990). See generally Stephanie M. Stern & Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPERTY (forthcoming 2019).
14. See discussion infra note 105–13.
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university students) hold unprejudiced attitudes.15 The limited number of studies that have examined behavior have found that exposure to discriminatory or
egalitarian social norms about a group also affects listeners’ subsequent behaviors and interactions with that group.16 As social psychologists Gretchen Sechrist and Charles Stangor observe, “If there is any lesson to be learned from
the history of social psychology, it is that attitudes change not so much through
persuasive appeals from others or even from direct experience as from perceptions about the beliefs of important in-group members.”17
Viewed through this lens, constraining the appearance of prejudice promotes non-discriminatory norms in real estate transactions. Research showing
the effect of even a single statement on listeners’ bias supports the legislative
decision to deny exemptions to § 3604(c) claims.18 Applying a social norms
framework to § 3604(c) also makes evident why violations should be judged
from the standpoint of an “ordinary listener,” which captures the normative
injury, rather than the standpoint of the speaker’s intent.19 Social norms offer
a new perspective on controversial FHA cases about extending standing to nonprofit organizations or white residents claiming injuries from segregation.20
While claiming an effect on social norms cannot be the sole basis of standing
– such an approach would obliterate standing as a doctrine of restriction – the
normative injuries from discriminatory housing speech are one factor that support the generous standing courts have already afforded to fair housing litigants.21
More globally, the social norms research counsels a shift from viewing
the purpose of housing speech regulation as solely to address emotional harms
to members of protected groups or to prevent listeners from misperceiving their

15. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 645, 647–49 (2001).
16. See, e.g., id. at 648 (measuring seating distance from an African-American
following exposure to information that the participant’s fellow students held racist versus egalitarian views).
17. Id. at 645. Evidence from other studies highlights the role of likeability of the
person expressing the norm and the social dimensions of groups and social norms. See,
e.g., Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of
Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 590–91 (2005).
18. See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 995–96; Monteith, Deneen & Tooman,
supra note 13, at 267.
19. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995).
20. The same theory of social norms supports controversial judicial decisions extending liability to third-party statements made by people who are not involved in the
real estate transaction and to statements of agents made at the direction of their principals. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372–79 (1982).
21. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Schwemm, supra note 5,
at 294–300.
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legal obligations under the FHA.22 Housing speech regulation also performs a
task critical to the FHA’s goal of promoting integration: it promotes social
norms against expressing housing prejudice in words or deeds.23
Social norms research has implications as well for contemporary debates
about housing speech. Recently, § 3604(c) has fulminated debate over its application to the Internet in online housing advertisements and posts.24 The prejudice-reducing power of communications highlights the welfare gains that
should be measured against internet providers’ interests in determining liability
for discriminatory housing posts on websites and raises concerns about court
decisions greatly cabining liability under the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”).25 A social norm framework also challenges the widely-accepted notion that associational rights should trump housing speech regulation when
people advertise for roommates.26 It is not clear why the interest in selecting a
roommate outweighs normative harm from discriminatory advertisements, particularly because the person advertising may lawfully decline a roommate or
home-sharer on the basis of a protected characteristic under exemptions in the
FHA.
This Article presents an empirically grounded model of social norms in
housing speech regulation. It unfolds in six parts. Part I describes the surprising robustness of § 3604(c) in light of the legislative history of the FHA and
the social costs of this provision. Part II explores the extensive psychology
research on the effect of discriminatory statements on prejudice. Part III argues
that the impact of discriminatory housing speech on social norms provides a
22. See, e.g., Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating
that without regulation of housing speech, readers and listeners are vulnerable to confusion about housing discrimination law).
23. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1160–62 (“Regardless of whether a particular group
is harmed more than another by a social norm, it may still be important for the law to
express society’s disapproval of that norm.”); see also, e.g., Fair Housing Issues in the
Gulf Coast in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 119th Cong. 6–7 (2006) (statement of assistant secretary of HUD Kim Kendrick
that discriminatory advertisements following Hurricane Katrina inflicted harm on those
who had already suffered).
24. See Andrew J. Crossett, Unfair Housing on the Internet: The Effect of the Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 73 MO. L. REV. 195, 206–11 (2008)
(discussing limits on fair housing enforcement under the Communications Decency
Act); Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L. J. 149, 149–60 (1969) (describing difficult legislative path to enactment); see also Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–80 (collecting data and assessing discriminatory roommate advertisements on an internet site).
25. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that website operator who “materially contributed” to the discriminatory
posting cannot enjoy immunity); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006): see also 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2018).
26. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1157–60.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

440

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

potent justification for § 3604(c). Part IV describes how seeming puzzles of
§ 3604, including the non-applicability of FHA exemptions, lack of an intent
requirement, and broad standing, are no longer surprising in view of the strong
normative effects of discriminatory statements. Part V notes some of the limitations of social norms for fair housing and the goal of residential integration.
Turning to recent controversies, Part VI addresses the implications of social
norms research for website providers’ liability for discriminatory housing
statements posted on their websites and the debate over § 3604(c)’s applicability to roommate advertisements.

I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S REGULATION OF HOUSING STATEMENTS
The FHA27 was enacted in 1968 amid growing concern about racial segregation and African-American ghettos.28 Racial segregation in housing had
burgeoned in the real estate industry, as landlords, sellers, brokers, and lenders
refused to transact with African-Americans, Jews, and other groups.29 Government “redlining” had also narrowed opportunities for minorities by systematically undervaluing properties in inner-city neighborhoods.30 Political organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) and the National Committee Against Discrimination began
to lobby, unsuccessfully, for housing civil rights legislation in the early
1960s.31 Following a number of urban riots, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a group, known as the Kerner Commission, to study the causes of civil
unrest.32 The Kerner Commission cited housing segregation and discrimination and it recommended that Congress adopt anti-discrimination housing legislation.33

27. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 45).
28. Schwemm, supra note 5, at 189–91; Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the

1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571, 571–74 (2015).
29. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 46–50 (1993).
30. Id. at 52. Redlining is the practice of denying or limiting mortgages and other
financial services to certain neighborhoods, often on the basis of race, regardless of
individual applicants’ credit-worthiness. Id.
31. Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and
the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 552
(2014).
32. Id. at 553.
33. Id.; see also John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner
Commission in Retrospect – An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1299–300 (1993).
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The FHA initially struggled to gain traction for passage.34 The House
passed a fair housing bill in 1966, and the Senate sponsored a bill in 1967.35 In
1968, Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke offered a fair housing
amendment to a more general civil rights bill passed by the House, which was
withdrawn in favor of a fair housing amendment by Senator Everett McKinley
Dirksen. Senator Dirksen’s amendment became the basis of the FHA.36 A few
days after the assassination of Martin Luther King, the House passed the
FHA.37 The goals of the statute, as elucidated in its legislative history and
subsequent interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, were to reduce
discrimination and advance integration – particularly racial integration between African-Americans and whites.38 These goals will feature prominently
in this Article’s analysis of the normative benefits of housing speech regulation.
The FHA prohibits discriminatory housing statements, as well as discrimination in housing transactions and lending. Specifically, the FHA forbids refusals to rent or sell a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, disability, or national origin,39 as well as discrimination in the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of a sale or rental.”40 The FHA also makes discrimination by individuals and entities engaged in residential real estate transactions,
such as brokers and lenders, unlawful.41

A. Regulating Housing Speech: Section 3604(c)
One provision of the FHA, however, addresses neither behavior nor discrimination in a transaction. Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful to “make,
print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
34. See Dubofsky, supra note 24, at 149–60; Margaret A. Fiorino, Advertising for
Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing Real Estate as a Violation of the
Fair Housing Act, 56 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1988) (describing objections
to “coercion, violation of the fundamental freedom to own and dispose of private property, and anti-majoritarianism” in the FHA’s legislative history).
35. Schwemm, supra note 5, at 197–98.
36. Id. at 198.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 212. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized integration as a
major goal of the FHA. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972), the Court held that white residents of an apartment complex had standing
to sue for injuries from segregation due to their landlord’s discrimination against African-Americans. This holding recognizes the harms from segregation to both AfricanAmericans and whites and, implicitly, the benefits of integration envisioned under the
FHA.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2018).
40. Id. § 3604(f)(2).
41. See id. § 3605.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

442

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

origin.”42 This provision regulates both oral and written housing statements.
For example, an advertisement by a landlord in a local newspaper that states
“black female tenant preferred” violates the FHA, as does the same statement
made face-to-face to applicants. Courts have also held that the FHA applies to
pictures, such as the use of all-white models, that indicate a racial preference
to the ordinary reader.43
The FHA imposes liability on the person making discriminatory statements as well as on publishers of discriminatory statements, such as newspapers, radio, or television.44 In the case of discriminatory internet postings – for
example, on online housing or roommate matching websites – the CDA typically shields operators of internet sites and online services from liability for
posting discriminatory statements about housing but does not shield the individual who posted the statement online.45 Complainants include fair housing
organizations, who search for discriminatory advertisements and use volunteer
or hired fair housing “testers” to pose as housing applicants, and private parties
who were subjected to discriminatory housing advertisements and oral statements.46 The remedies for a § 3604(c) claim are actual damages for emotional
harms and expenses (e.g., greater housing search costs) as a result of reading
or hearing the discriminatory statement and punitive damages; injunctive and
equitable relief are also available.47 For cases tried in an administrative proceeding or by the U.S. attorney general, the defendant may face additional civil
penalties.48
42. See id. § 3604(c).
43. See, e.g., Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1058 (E.D. Va.

1987). For further analysis of § 3604(c)’s application to pictorial advertisements and
models, see Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1433–43; Ivan C. Smith, Comment, Discriminatory Use of Models in Housing Advertisement: The Ordinary Black Reader Standard,
54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1521, 1527–34 (1993).
44. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (1972) (holding a newspaper liable
for publishing discriminatory housing advertisement). This has dramatically reduced
such advertisements in print and other non-internet media. See Andrene N. Plummer,
Comment, A Few New Solutions to a Very Old Problem: How the Fair Housing Act
Can Be Improved to Deter Discriminatory Conduct by Real Estate Brokers, 47 HOW.
L. J. 163, 177 (2003).
45. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008);
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2008).
46. Fred Freiberg, A Test of Our Fairness, 41 URB. LAW. 239, 240–41 (2009);
Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1433–43.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (2018) (enforcement by a private person); id. § 3612
(g)(3) (enforcement by Secretary); id. § 3614(d)(1)(A)–(B) (enforcement by Attorney
General); see also Schwemm, supra note 5, at 302–09.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3)(A)–(C) (administrative proceedings); id. §
3614(d)(1)(C) (federal suit by attorney general); see also The FHEO Complaint and
Investigation Process, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/complaint-process (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). See generally
SCHWEMM, supra note 6.
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Section 3604(c) was a surprising addition to the FHA in a number of respects. In a bill that barely eked its way to legislation, an expansive provision
regulating commercial speech seems anomalous. Section 3604(c) not only survived a contentious legislative process, but it emerged with arguably greater
strength and certainly broader reach than other parts of the FHA. Section
3604(c) takes a strict liability approach to discriminatory housing statements.
Thus, unlike the FHA provisions addressing discriminatory refusals to rent,
sell, or lend,49 § 3604(c) does not require that a discriminatory action (e.g.,
refusal to extend housing) occurred.50
Section 3604(c) does not even require the speaker to intend discrimination. The statutory language requires only that the speaker “indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on [a protected status],”51 unlike
other sections of the FHA that require plaintiffs to show that the alleged discriminatory act occurred “because of” their membership in a protected group.52
In § 3604(c) claims, courts determine violations based on whether an ordinary
listener would perceive discrimination based on membership in protected
group.53 For example, a landlord who publishes an advertisement stating that
an apartment is best suited for a couple without children has likely violated
§ 3604(c) even if he did not intend to exclude families and has rented to families with children in the past. It would be irrelevant to a § 3604(c) claim if,
following publication of the advertisement, the landlord ultimately rented the
apartment to a family with young children.
Compared to other provisions of the FHA, § 3604(c) imposes broader liability because the exemptions applicable to other provisions of the FHA do
not apply to housing statements. Discrimination in rentals and sales is subject
to an expansive exemption for small-scale landlords. The federal “Mrs. Murphy” provision exempts dwelling units or rooms in a four-unit or fewer multifamily dwelling where the owner occupies one dwelling unit as her residence
from liability for discrimination in rentals and sales.54 Approximately half of
the states have adopted Mrs. Murphy exemptions identical to the federal approach; most of the remaining states make the exemption more limited (e.g.,
limiting the Mrs. Murphy exemption to owner-occupants of two-unit buildings

49. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (refusal to sell or rent); id § 3604(b) (discrimination in
terms, conditions, or services of sale or rental); id. § 3605 (discrimination by businesses
engaged in lending, selling, brokering, constructing, repairing, or improving, or appraising residential real estate).
50. Id. § 3604(c).
51. Id.
52. See id. § 3604(a); id § 3604(b); id § 3604(d); id § 3605(a).
53. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD,
967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).
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rather than four or fewer units).55 There is another exemption for landlords or
sellers of single-family homes if the owner does not own more than three single-family homes and does not use a real estate broker or agent.56 However,
the FHA provides that these exemptions do not apply to claims under
§ 3604(c).57 This means that, under federal law, a Mrs. Murphy may discriminatorily refuse to rent to a Latino tenant with impunity but cannot advertise
that preference in her local newspaper. This is an awkward result that has generated critique. For example, one housing scholar has argued in favor of subjecting § 3604(c) to the Mrs. Murphy exemption, noting that there is “something a little backward about a regime in which particular conduct is permitted,
but statements of intent to commit that conduct are not.”58
The other major exemptions in the FHA are for private clubs and religious
organizations.59 These organizations may limit the sale, rental, or occupancy
of dwellings that they own or operate on the basis of religion, gender, and other
characteristics but not on the basis of race, color, or national origin.60 This
provision allows private clubs and religious organizations to restrict membership on the basis of some characteristics otherwise protected under the FHA.61
However, the exemption applies to “sale, rental, or occupancy” and does not
apply to advertisements, notices, and other housing statements covered under
§ 3604(c).62 Fair housing scholar Robert Schwemm’s excavation of the legislative history, the enactment, and the subsequent judicial interpretation of
§ 3604(c) notes that no reported case has extended the exemptions for private
clubs and religious organizations to a § 3604(c) claim.63 There is only one part
of the FHA, a narrow provision for familial status claims against senior housing, that is not subject to § 3604(c).64 In general, courts have tended to construe

55. See Scott M. Badami, The FHA’s “Mrs. Murphy” Exemption – A 50 State
Guide, FAIR HOUSING DEF. (Apr. 22, 2013), https://fairhousing.foxrothschild.com/2013/04/articles/fha-basics/the-fhas-mrs-murphy-exemption-a-50-stateguide/. For examples of state statutes that limit the state’s exemption to two-unit owner
occupied residential buildings see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.365 (West 2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (2018).
56. Id. § 3603(b)(1).
57. Id. § 3603(b).
58. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1165.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607.
60. Id. § 3607(a).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. There is at least one mention in the legislative history of an intent to exempt
§ 3604(c) to shield religious and fraternal organizations, but it does not appear crystallized and has not been heeded by the courts. Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)(ii). This provision actually requires the housing providers to publish and follow policies demonstrating their intent to house people
fifty-five years of age or older. Id.
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the exemptions narrowly for all kinds of claims brought under the FHA.65 Section 3604(c), by virtue of its explicit exclusion from the exemptions, is most
benefited.66 However, a recent development that has undermined § 3604(c)’s
impact is the CDA’s protection of internet website operators from liability for
discriminatory posts and advertisements by users on their sites.
The application of § 3604(c) to small-scale landlords and roommate advertisements and its eschewal of intent have provoked public consternation. In
some cases, such as “mom and pop” landlords or roommate seekers, speakers
mistakenly believe it is lawful to express preferences on the basis of protected
characteristics.67 Punishing ambiguous housing speech without evidence of
intent or actual discrimination may also deplete political support for fair housing regulation and cultivate the sentiment that, as one reporter opined, “weak
[words] can cost you.”68 An example of such a case comes from Bader v. Fair
Housing Council of Orange County, litigation that ensued when the Orange
County, California, fair housing authority fined a small-scale landlord $4,000
and required him to attend a course on fair housing.69 Bader, the landlord, had
posted a Craigslist advertisement describing his 480 square foot apartment as
“well-suited for 1 or 2 professional adults.”70 To no avail, Bader vigorously
argued in court, and to the press, that he had not intended discrimination based
on familial status and in fact had rented the apartment to families with children
multiple times in the past.71 While Bader did not prevail in court, his case
attracted media attention and negative publicity for the local fair housing
agency.72

B. Costs and Challenges of Housing Speech Regulation
In addition to the problems of public acceptance and backlash noted
above, regulation of discriminatory housing statements limits speech, imposes
enforcement costs, and possibly shifts, rather than reduces, discriminatory activity. The enactment and maintenance of § 3604(c) is even more startling in
light of its costs. These costs underscore the importance of the nature and magnitude of § 3604(c)’s countervailing benefits. This Section considers some of
the costs of the FHA’s regulation of discriminatory housing speech.

65. E.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1995).
66. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 883 (3d

Cir. 1990); Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31 (noting that the Mrs. Murphy, singlefamily home, private club, and religious organization exemptions have “rarely succeeded in shielding FHA defendants from liability”).
67. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1167.
68. See Brian Joseph, Unfair Fight?, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 28, 2008),
https://www.ocregister.com/2008/03/28/unfair-fight/.
69. No. G041118, 2010 WL 740185, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2010).
70. See id. at *2.
71. Id. at *3; Joseph, supra note 68.
72. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 68.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

446

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

1. Free Speech
Section 3604(c) imposes liability for both written and oral speech.73 In
doing so, it affects the important constitutional right (and political tinderbox)
of the First Amendment. Section 3604(c) regulates commercial speech, which
is entitled to a lower standard of protection than non-commercial speech.74 In
virtually all § 3604(c) cases, there has been no constitutional violation under
the United States Supreme Court precedent in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.75 Central Hudson creates a four-part test
to determine the constitutionality of government regulation of commercial
speech, with the first prong of the test requiring that the speech “must concern
lawful activity” to receive First Amendment protection.76 Because the housing
discrimination underlying § 3604(c) speech is illegal under the FHA, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, and usually state or local housing law as well, discriminatory housing statements do not concern a lawful activity and thus are not protected speech.77 The rationale for excluding speech about unlawful activity
from the auspices of First Amendment protection is that such speech is unlikely
to provide the kind of full, accurate market of information that the First Amendment seeks to preserve in commercial speech cases.78 Courts that have considered First Amendment challenges to § 3604(c) have rejected those claims.79
While it passes constitutional muster, § 3604(c) causes a substantial degree of constitutional discomfort. This occurs in two ways. First, the animating ideals of the First Amendment support a default position of protecting free
speech – both personal or political speech and to a lesser extent commercial
speech.80 This sentiment underlies resistance and political upset over housing
statement regulation.81 Interestingly, one reason for supporting freedom to engage in discriminatory or hateful speech is the idea that hearing such speech

73. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018).
74. Samuel A. DiLullo, The Present Status of Commercial Speech: Looking for a

Clear Definition, 90 DICK. L. REV. 705, 705–06 (1986).
75. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
76. Id. at 566.
77. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 273–76.
78. See id. at 272–78.
79. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002–05 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211–15 (4th Cir. 1972). The cases where courts
have raised First Amendment concerns have involved statements unrelated to the housing transaction or cases where the facts make unclear if the statement indicated discrimination against a protected group. See, e.g., Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710
n.2 (6th Cir. 1985).
80. See DiLullo, supra note 74, at 705–06.
81. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 5, at 85–101 (arguing that the government does
not have a constitutionally legitimate interest in eradicating discriminatory expressions
or attitudes).
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will change listeners’ minds in the opposite direction.82 The psychology research suggests that this is unlikely to occur if listeners perceive the speaker as
representing a consensus view or a group with whom they identify.83 Yet, other
rationales for free speech protection, including safeguarding personal liberty
and the flow of information, remain and create tension over housing speech
regulation.84
The political consternation over First Amendment rights and potential
over-reach is evident in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations, which were adopted following political outcry over
a HUD investigation. HUD investigated three residents who used petitions and
newsletters to advocate against a homeless center in part on the basis of the
disabled status of the residents the center would serve.85 The investigation
sought to determine whether the residents had violated the FHA, including
§ 3617, which makes it unlawful to threaten or interfere with a housing transaction because of a protected status.86 Media publicity about the investigation
galvanized public backlash.87 Although HUD ultimately found that the residents were expressing their political beliefs and influencing the political process, the controversy led the agency to issue guidelines defining the scope of
its authority.88 The guidance clarifies that under FHA § 3617 speech directed
toward achieving action by a government official or entity is protected under
the First Amendment so long as it does not involve force or threats.89 It also
delineates steps the agency must take to “make every effort to assure” that
chilling of speech does not occur and to withdraw agency investigations when
it becomes apparent that First Amendment protections apply.90 While this
guidance does not address § 3604(c) specifically, First Amendment concerns
in housing speech investigations are likely similar.

82. See John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1341–54
(2008) (conceptualizing communication as behaviors intended to change minds
through the free will of the listener).
83. See infra Part II.
84. For further discussion on this point, see infra Section III.B.
85. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
86. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2018).
87. For more detail on this controversy, see Michael P. Seng, Hate Speech and
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 409–10 (1996);
but see Bernstein, supra note 5, at 134–38 (describing HUD as making a wrongful preliminary finding and intimidating the residents).
88. See White, 227 F.3d at 1228.
89. HUD, NOTICE FHEO-2015-01, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS
ON FILING AND INVESTIGATING FAIR HOUSING ACT COMPLAINTS THAT MAY IMPLICATE
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2 (2015).
90. Id. at 3.
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Second, many residential real estate transactions implicate interests in
freedom of association and involve individual owners without particular business or legal expertise.91 A retired homeowner advertising to rent a room or
basement apartment in his house or a college student seeking a roommate via
a campus posting are not what comes to many people’s minds when they think
of “commercial speech.” The prototypical commercial transaction does not
require ongoing physical proximity and interaction once the transaction is complete. Of course, many aspects of residential real estate transactions – such as
lending, rentals that are not owner-occupied, development, and brokering – do
not entail ongoing associational interests. What makes § 3604(c) controversial
on free speech grounds are contexts that implicate associational concerns or
involve a hybrid of commercial and non-commercial speech.
Regulating housing statements within the bounds of the First Amendment
creates complexity and uncertainty for litigants and courts. For example,
courts have had to consider whether statements made during, but not in reference to, a real estate action give rise to a claim under the FHA and have declined to extend liability in part due to First Amendment concerns.92 A lingering question has been whether the benefits of § 3604(c) justify the costs to not
only free speech but also to clarity, certainty, and judicial administration.

2. Policy Targeting
The FHA was designed with limited resources for enforcement. Indeed,
enforcement power was a sticking point during the enactment process.93 Housing scholars Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton describe weak enforcement
as “the price of passage.”94 The FHA provides three paths to legal relief: suits
by private parties, administrative complaints to HUD, and, in cases involving
a pattern or practice or issue of public importance, enforcement by the U.S.
attorney general.95 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and HUD have limited

91. Most landlords own only a single property. See FOREMOST INSURANCE
GROUP, LANDLORD MARKET FACTS 3 (2014), https://cp.foremost.com/marketfacts/9012548-landlord-market-facts-2014.pdf.
92. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 276.
93. See id. at 203–05. In particular, the infamous “Dirksen Compromise” garnered
Senator Dirksen’s needed vote in exchange for granting HUD only conciliation and
persuasion powers. For more detail on this and other concessions on enforcement, see
Dubofsky, supra note 24, at 149–60.
94. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 29, at 195. But see Jonathan Zasloff, The
Secret History of the Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247, 248 (2016) (concluding that legislators’ intentions for the FHA’s robust operation and enforcement
were not as tepid as scholars have alleged).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2018) (private person); id. § 3610 (administrative enforcement); id. § 3614 (enforcement by attorney general).
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staff and resources to enforce the FHA, including § 3604(c).96 The FHA partially alleviates the federal burden by requiring HUD to refer housing discrimination complaints to a state or local public agency with jurisdiction so long as
the applicable rights, procedures, and remedies are substantially equivalent to
the FHA.97 The FHA also requires HUD to attempt “conciliation” and voluntary resolution of complaints.98 Given the limitations of federal enforcement,
the primary means of enforcing the FHA is through private litigation by individual plaintiffs and fair housing organizations.99 Non-profit housing organizations are responsible for most of the major judicial decisions clarifying, and
in some cases extending, the FHA.100
In some cases, § 3604(c) may consume enforcement resources or divert
them from allegations of discriminatory acts to seemingly less injurious, or less
certain to be injurious, discriminatory statements. For example, a fair housing
agency investigating a discriminatory advertisement might instead devote
those resources to substantive discrimination cases or greater enforcement of
the FHA’s provision that localities “affirmatively further fair housing” – a provision that saw brief enforcement attempts during the Obama era.101 In practice, most – but not all – cases with a § 3604(c) claim also involve additional
claims for discriminatory refusal to rent or sell or discrimination in the terms
and conditions of a real estate transaction.102 This reduces the cost of investigating and enforcing § 3604(c) because the various claims include shared facts
and, if litigated, are presented together in a single case. Also, fair housing
organizations, who are de facto the primary enforcers of the FHA, can choose
96. See Massey, supra note 28, at 583. For example, Bill Lann Lee writes that,
while the attorney general has brought important cases, federal resources and federal
authority, particularly prior to the 1988 amendments to the FHA, “was far from powerful or complete.” Bill Lann Lee, An Issue of Public Importance: The Justice Department’s Enforcement of The Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/issue-public-importance (last updated Aug. 6, 2015).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(3).
98. Id. § 3610(b).
99. See Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375 (1988) (“The [FHA] is designed to rely primarily on
private enforcement.”); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209
(“[C]omplaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with
the [FHA].”).
100. See Schwemm, supra note 99, at 381–82.
101. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing:
A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further”
Mandate, 100 KENTUCKY L. J. 154, 176 (2012). See generally Jonathon Sheffield, At
Forty-Five Years Old the Obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing Gets a
Face-List, But Will It Integrate America’s Cities?, 25 U. FLA. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 71
(2014); Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Opening Doors to Fair Housing: Enforcing the
Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 2135, 2167–68 (2010).
102. I thank fair housing scholar Robert Schwemm for his helpful comments on
this point.
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to prioritize fair lending, steering, or other cases over housing speech complaints. More fundamentally, the view that § 3604(c) creates problematic misallocations assumes that § 3604(c) is a less effective provision of the FHA and
thus less worthy of enforcement resources – a claim that this Article will dispute in Parts II and III.

3. Discrimination Distortion
The regulation of housing speech may cause discrimination to morph into
other forms. For example, following the enactment of the FHA, real estate
advertisements often eschewed written or oral statements and instead advertised photographs and other media using all-white models as buyers, tenants,
or borrowers.103 Forbidden from statements of racial preference, the use of allwhite models conveyed the same message with legal impunity. Judicial opinions subsequently restricted the use of all-white models in cases of repeated
and numerous advertisements by an advertiser.104 Thorny questions remain
about where to draw the line on white model frequency and whether to aggregate different advertisements run by the same publisher to determine publisher
liability.105 Courts have refused to extend liability to publishers based on aggregate advertisements.106
Businesses, advertisers, and publishers can adapt, usually quite rapidly,
to convey their intended message via lawful alternatives. Restricting discriminatory written advertisements and images may give rise to other, subtler ways
of signaling preferences. For example, legal scholar Lior Strahilevitz theorizes
that by incorporating and advertising “exclusionary amenities” associated with
certain racial or other types of groups, developers and owners can attract the
type of buyer they prefer.107 This can occur in localities, neighborhoods, or
common interest communities. For example, a subdivision development may
103. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that § 3604(c) applies to use of models to express racial preference).
104. See, e.g., Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1000 (holding that § 3604(c) applies to use of
models to express racial preference); see also Fiorino, supra note 34, at 1431–36.
105. When there is an insufficient number of all-white model advertisements from
a single advertiser for a viable § 3604(c) claim, litigants have sought to hold publishers
liable based on the fact that all of the publication’s advertisements, viewed in the aggregate, display white models exclusively or near-exclusively. See, e.g., Ragin, 923
F.2d at 1002; Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943
F.2d 644, 648, 653 (6th Cir. 1991); cf. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits
of the Fair Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of
Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 69, 155–59 (1995) (arguing for image equality by publishers and extension of
FHA liability to aggregate white advertisements from different sources to combat the
narrative of white superiority).
106. See, e.g., Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002; Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., 943
F.2d at 648, 653.
107. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities,
92 VA. L. REV. 437, 450–79 (2006).
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add golf courses and clubs, which are historically associated with whites, to
attract buyers who prefer a white residential environment and to dissuade potential minority buyers.108 The willingness to pay for the golf course, or other
shared “club” goods associated with or attractive to a specific group, functions
as a sorting device.109 Although the FHA prohibits direct advertisements or
statements of exclusion by developers, buyers can still purchase “the ‘benefits’
of exclusion” of groups otherwise protected by fair housing law by seeking out
residential communities with exclusionary amenities.110
In the social media era, prejudice and discrimination can also shift from
discriminatory oral statements and newspaper advertisements to social media
sites and posts. This can occur directly when landlords or buyers eschew explicit discrimination in a printed advertisement and instead advertise housing
on social media to a network of “friends” who are exclusively or predominantly
from groups favored by the poster. The morphing of discrimination can also
occur as people who face liability for discriminatory housing speech instead
express animus and prejudice on social media indirectly and somewhat more
subtly. For example, a person who cannot lawfully post a “for rent whites
only” sign on their lawn can instead express prejudice by posting a confederate
flag on her social media page.
The issue is not merely that discrimination has changed forms. It is that
these forms of discrimination may be more harmful, costly, or legally complex
to redress. Section 3604(c), like all legal rules, creates incentives and channels
behavior. This observation does not condemn § 3604(c) but rather underscores
the question: why regulate discriminatory housing statements?

II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS AND PREJUDICE
The power of social norms to reduce the expression of prejudice and discrimination is an important justification for § 3604(c)’s sometimes costly regulation of housing speech. Discriminatory housing statements shape the perceived norms of landlords, sellers, lenders, and other housing market participants. Social norms operate through our beliefs about how others think and

108. See id. at 464–76. Other legal scholars have also theorized about the informational and focal effects of symbols, such as Eric Posner who theorizes that people conform to in order to signal cooperative behavior and enable cooperation. See Eric A.
Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
765, 767 (1998).
109. See Strahilevitz, supra note 107, at 441–43. Beginning in the 1990s there was
a staggering increase in golf course development, id. at 468, which corresponded with
African-American migration into the suburbs, id. at 466. While factors other than exclusionary amenities may explain the increase in golf courses, Strahilevitz notes that
several aspects of the growth of golf developments are consistent with exclusionary
amenities as one motivating factor. See id. at 469.
110. Id. at 442.
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act, regardless of whether our beliefs are accurate.111 The effect of norms is so
robust that even a single communication that suggests a social norm influences
listeners’ prejudice and behavior.112 There is even evidence that exposure to a
social norm affects automatic, unconscious racial attitudes.113 Social norms
expressed in housing advertisements and statements indicate the frequency and
the acceptability of prejudice and discrimination in housing.114
A seminal work in social norm psychology, Sherif and Sherif’s Group
Norm Theory, describes prejudice forming primarily in relation to social norms
that become standardized “common property” of the group.115 Sherif and Sherif describe a socialization process whereby “[t]he individual’s major social
attitudes are formed in relation to group norms.”116 Social norm theory is
highly influential in psychology and research; however, it is hardly the only
theory of the cause of prejudice. It is unlikely that there is a unitary root that
accounts for all instances of prejudice. Other theories, for example, describe
prejudice as stemming from the need to conserve cognitive resources through
categorization or an “authoritarian” personality type.117 Comparing these factors, research by Thomas Pettigrew indicates that social norms play a stronger
role than authoritarian personality or childhood influences.118
111. Mirroring the psychological research, prejudice in this Article refers to negative attitudes or affects toward a group or an individual based on group membership
and discrimination refers to behaviors on the basis of these categorical evaluations. See
Fiske, supra note 12, at 357 (“[S]tereotyping is taken as the most cognitive component,
prejudice as the most affective component, and discrimination as the most behavioral
component of category-based reactions . . . .”). See generally Crandall, Social Norms,
supra note 13, at 359.
112. Fiske, supra note 12, at 367–68.
113. Sinclair et al., supra note 17, at 590–91. Researchers measured the effect of
social norms on unconscious bias using a psychological test call the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”). Id. at 584.
114. Robert Cialdini and his colleagues divide norms into two categories. Robert
B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990). Descriptive norms provide information about the frequency or typicality of an attitude or behavior and help people to
choose and behave “accurately.” Id. Injunctive norms provide information about the
degree of social approval or disapproval toward a behavior. Id. Knowing the injunctive
norms of a group helps to secure social approval and acceptance within that group. Id.
This typology maps imperfectly to discriminatory housing statements. Discriminatory
advertisements and housing statement appear to convey both elements of information
(frequency of housing discrimination) and injunction (do or do not discriminate).
115. See MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 124 (1936). Sherif concluded that “the attitude of prejudice is a product of group membership.” Id. at
66.
116. See MUZAFER SHERIF & CAROLYN W. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HARMONY AND
TENSION 202–03 (1953).
117. See Fiske, supra note 12, at 358–63.
118. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice, 59 J.
OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 28, 28–30 (1959) [hereinafter Pettigrew, Regional
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The information communicated to people about prejudiced beliefs held
by a group they find desirable can substantially shift listeners’ prejudices. A
study by Charles Stangor, Gretchen Sechrist, and John Jost demonstrates how
manipulating consensus information can shift the attitudes that people subsequently express in the direction of the perceived consensus.119 In this study, a
group of European-American University of Maryland students estimated the
percentage of African-Americans who possess nineteen stereotypical traits,
both positive and negative.120 The students created a second set of identical
ratings based on how they believed other students at University of Maryland
viewed African-Americans.121 One week later, the experimenter shared information with those students about the percentage of other university students
who believed African-Americans possessed each of the traits.122 This information was engineered so that the participants received information about other
students’ views that was more positive than each participant’s individual initial
ratings.123 Then, the students provided a final rating of their beliefs by completing the same stereotype questionnaire used in the first session.124 The researchers found that participants reported fewer negative stereotypes and more
positive ones after learning that their fellow students viewed African-Americans positively.125 Conversely, when experimenters told a second group that
their fellow students had negative beliefs about African-Americans, those participants reported more negative stereotypes but not a lower probability of positive stereotypes.126 The magnitude of the participants’ reported attitude
change was substantial.127 Studies that have similarly manipulated information
about the “majority” opinion on gay rights have found similar shifts in attitudes
based on the communication of norms.128
Even people who are highly prejudiced are susceptible to normative influence and report reduced prejudice following exposure to egalitarian norms.
In a mock jury experiment, Bernd Wittenbrink and Julia Henley sorted research
participants into “high prejudice” and “low prejudice” categories based on their
Differences]; Thomas F. Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison, 2 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 29, 35–
40 (1958).
119. Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486–87. The students were enrolled
in an introductory psychology class at University of Maryland. Id. at 488.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 488–89.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 489.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 493.
126. Id.
127. Id. In the view of Stangor, Sechrist and Jost, manipulating consensus information is more effective than attempts to lessen prejudice through contact with members of differing groups or appeals to morality. See id. at 486; cf. GORDON ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 10 (1954).
128. See Clark & Maass, supra note 13, at 99.
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scores on a psychological test entitled the Modern Racism Scale.129 One group
received biased response scales, which indicated that others thought that a high
proportion of African-Americans have negative traits, while a second group of
participants received information indicating that others thought a high proportion of African Americans have positive traits.130 After receiving positive information, the participants who initially tested as high in racial prejudice reported more favorable attitudes toward African-Americans than those who received negative information.131 The participants also reported a more positive
evaluation of a hypothetical African-American defendant accused of armed
robbery.132 The low-prejudice participants showed no effects from either positive or negative information, which suggests that the need to conform was not
the sole reason for attitude changes.133
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence of social norms comes from a field
study of the effect of anti-conflict and egalitarian messages delivered through
a radio soap opera.134 A 2009 study in Rwanda by Elizabeth Levy Paluck assessed the impact of a radio soap opera whose storyline and characters paralleled the history of the Tutsis and Hutus.135 Radio is the most frequently consumed form of media in Rwanda and is thus likely to exhibit a substantial effect
on norms.136 The soap opera delivered messages about reducing prejudice and
violence against other groups to the experimental group, while a control group
listened to a radio soap opera with messages about health behaviors.137 The
experiment found that, compared to the control group who listened to a radio
soap opera about health behavior, participants who listened to the radio soap
opera advocating egalitarian and non-violent behaviors reported consonant perceptions of social norms.138 There were also changes in behavior. Compared
to listeners of the health soap opera, participants who listened to the reconciliation soap opera offered more dissenting opinions in community discussions,
engaged in greater negotiation, and made more bids for group cooperation and
other alternatives when deciding how to share the radio and batteries among
villagers.139

129. Bernd Wittenbrink & Julia R. Henley, Creating Social Reality: Informational
Social Influence and the Content of Stereotypic Beliefs, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 598, 600–02 (1996).
130. Id. at 600.
131. Id. at 603.
132. Id. at 602–03.
133. Id. at 604–05.
134. See generally Paluck, supra note 13, at 574.
135. Id. at 574–75.
136. Id. at 576.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 581–82.
139. Id. at 582. In contrast, the health soap opera listeners typically proposed and
agreed to allowing the village’s local authority to regulate these goods with little discussion. Id.
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There is also substantial indirect evidence of the effect of social norms on
the perceived acceptability of prejudice. For example, an experiment that
asked one group of undergraduate students to rate the normative acceptability
of negative feelings about 105 different groups (e.g., African-Americans, obese
people, child abusers) as “definitely OK,” “maybe OK,” or definitely not OK”
and asked a second group to rate their personal attitudes toward these groups
found near-perfect correlation between the two groups’ responses.140 In a subsequent experiment, the researchers found high correlation between how participants rated the “acceptability of discrimination” averaged across a different
group of undergraduate study participants and participant reports of the likelihood that they would discriminate against a member of that group when renting
an apartment, dating, or making an employment decision.141 The researchers
concluded that “[p]eople will report their own prejudice according to how
much it is socially acceptable.”142 Low variability in attitudes standing alone
is insufficient to “prove” a social norm effect. Yet, no other theory to explain
these findings has emerged. This line of research provides additional empirical
substantiation to the studies discussed previously that directly assessed normative interventions and found conformity effects.
Changes in attitudes and behavior following social norm interventions
appear at least moderately durable. Emily Zitek and Michelle Hebl’s research
found persistent effects one month after participants heard a norm-activating
statement by an experimenter posing as a bystander (a confederate) who condoned or condemned prejudice.143 The normative effects were not as strong
one month later compared to immediately after hearing the statement of the
confederate, but they were still significant. Other research has measured the
effects of norms one week after the experiment and has similarly found durability.144 Due to the difficulty of long-term follow-up, particularly with undergraduate students who often participate in experiments, there is no research
assessing norm-conforming attitudes or behaviors several months or years after
an experimental intervention.
A critical question from the perspective of fair housing is whether attitude
change following communication of a norm translates into behavior. There is
significant evidence of behavior change in the studies that have addressed this
question. However, more research is needed to understand the contexts likely
to produce behavior change and its underlying mechanisms. In Sechrist and
Stangor’s 2001 study, the experimenters told high-prejudice and low-prejudice
participants that other university students shared their views about AfricanAmericans.145 The experimenters then asked the participants to leave the room
140.
141.
142.
143.

Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, 362–63.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 363.
Emily M. Zitek & Michelle R. Hebl, The Role of Social Norm Clarity in the
Influenced Expression of Prejudice Over Time, 43 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
867, 867 (2006).
144. See Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486.
145. Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 15, at 645.
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and sit in a nearby seating area while the experimenters fixed a computer malfunction.146 An African-American student who was recruited by the experimenters was stationed in the seat closest to the experimental room that the participants exited.147 When high-prejudice participants learned that other university students shared the same stereotypes of African-Americans, those participants sat further away from the African-American student in the hallway in
comparison to high-prejudice participants told that fellow students did not
share their views.148 Low-prejudice participants who learned that fellow students shared their views also sat closer to the African-American student than
low-prejudice participants who learned that other students believed negative
stereotypes.149 Other psychology experiments have found that pre-existing attitudes toward people of different races can affect behavior, such as friendliness
in interpersonal interactions.150
Interestingly, behavior change can occur even when a norm does not affect a listener’s personal beliefs. The Paluck field experiment in Rwanda found
strong evidence of behavior change from the radio soap opera norm-intervention but no effect on personal beliefs.151 Applied to housing, the prevalence of
non-discriminatory housing advertisements and statements may communicate
to a listener the normative unacceptability of discrimination in housing transactions while not affecting the listener’s prejudiced private beliefs. Belief internalization is desirable because it generalizes to new contexts and likely promotes stronger compliance. However, behavior change standing alone has substantial potential to reduce housing discrimination and open real estate markets.

III. A SOCIAL NORMS MODEL OF HOUSING STATEMENT REGULATION
The FHA controls communications and, indirectly, the public’s perception of typical attitudes and conduct toward protected groups in housing transactions. Eric Posner has described the state’s role in anti-discrimination as that

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 647.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. The underlying mechanisms driving the effect on social norms are unclear
and likely due to multiple variables.
150. See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and
Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
62, 66 (2002) (finding that self-reported racial attitudes predicted verbal behavior toward African-Americans, while unconscious, automatic prejudice scores affected nonverbal friendliness and raters’ perceptions of bias in the interaction). But see Stéphane
Doyen et al., Behavioral Priming: It’s All in the Mind, But Whose Mind?, PLOS-ONE,
Jan. 18, 2012, at 1 (replication study failing to find effect of exposure to a stereotype
on participants’ subsequent behavior).
151. Paluck, supra note 13, at 574.
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of a “norm entrepreneur” that employs not only law but also symbols and symbolic gestures to promote social norms.152 Posner observes that “antidiscrimination laws raise the cost of sending the signal” that one wishes to cooperate
with others in a certain group or to discriminate against other groups.153 The
psychological research on social norms reveals another effect. Laws controlling housing communications shape the attitudes and behavior listeners perceive as expected of them.
Applying empirical insights from psychology, this Part first examines
how discriminatory advertisements shape social norms and prejudice. Next,
the analysis turns to the dynamics and consequences of discriminatory oral
speech, which typically reaches smaller audiences. Then, this Part considers
research that suggests that the effects of discriminatory statements may differ
based on the identity of the group that is the subject of the speech. It concludes
by describing how a social norms model of § 3604(c) and attention to the prejudice-enhancing effects of discriminatory housing speech support the integration goals at the heart of the FHA’s enactment.

A. Discriminatory Advertisements
The psychological research on social norms reveals important justifications for regulating housing speech – and for doing so strictly and without exception. Let us turn first to discriminatory advertisements and notices, which
by virtue of their wider audience typically have a more powerful effect on social norms than oral statements. For landlords and sellers, discriminatory advertisements and notices communicate prejudiced norms of expression and
conduct in residential rentals and sales. The number of discriminatory advertisements influences the normative impact because it conveys information
about the strength of the majority and hence the norm.154 A high number of
discriminatory advertisements from speakers perceived as similar to the listener takes on the status of “consensus information,” which research has shown
152. Posner, supra note 108, at 778. He elaborates that, in addition to laws, “official pronouncements play an important role[] because official[s] enjoy the attention of
the nation and thus can cheaply create focal points . . . . [This] accounts for the heavily
symbolic content of so much political behavior.” Id.
153. Id. at 787.
154. See Clark & Maass, supra note 13, at 99 (discussing norm-induced attitude
changes moderated by the numerical strength of the majority); Masser & Phillips, supra
note 13, at 184 (finding that people lower in homophobia expressed less prejudice than
those higher in homophobia after hearing an alleged majority opinion either in support
of or opposed to gay rights); Benjamin H. Walker, H. Colleen Sinclair & John MacArthur, Social Norms Versus Social Motives: The Effects of Social Influence and Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions on the Expression of Prejudice, 10 SOC.
INFLUENCE 55, 64 (2015) (finding people who faced unanimous opposition to their position on gay rights from four experimenters disguised as participants showed more
conformity, though not change in personal beliefs, than those faced with non-unanimous opposition).
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affects listeners’ expressed attitudes and sometimes their behaviors.155 However, even a single statement of prejudice or egalitarianism can shift listeners’
attitudes and actions in a corresponding manner, presumably because the statement communicates a norm or activates a pre-existing norm in the listener.
Importantly, these effects may be on the attitudes that people express to others
rather than the attitudes themselves. Recall that some studies have found that
while communications conveying prejudice changed perceptions of norms and
in some cases behavior, the communications did not affect participants’ personal beliefs.156
In addition to affecting social norms, discriminatory advertisements and
other statements may cause housing participants to misapprehend their legal
obligations under the FHA. Discriminatory advertisements and speech cause
confusion about the law – an important point in a statute with underfunded enforcement.157 As then-judge, now Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote in Spann
v. Colonial Village, Inc. for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, discriminatory statements can create “a public impression that
segregation in housing is legal, thus facilitating discrimination by defendants
or other property owners . . . .”158
The strength of conformity to social norms increases when the norm emanates from a group the listener feels affinity with or finds desirable.159 Much
of the research discussed in this Article uses protocols that inform people that
their fellow university students, jurors, or members of other personally relevant
groups hold a certain view.160 Research has also found that exposing people
who identify highly with a group to that group’s norms affected intentions to
engage in behaviors supported by the group.161 The same was not true for low
identifiers.162 Applied to discriminatory housing publications, it seems likely
that landlords or sellers will be highly attentive to the actions of their peers.
This occurs because of their identification as part of a group (e.g., landlords in
a certain city) as well as because the advertisements suggest norms for residential transactions. Interestingly, the data on landlords reveal that their demographic characteristics are surprisingly cohesive with a broad swathe sharing
similar investment profiles (number of properties owned) as well as educational and family backgrounds.163 These similarities may increase landlords’
155. See supra Part II; see also Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 15, at 645; Wittenbrink & Henley, supra note 129, at 598–610.
156. See supra Part II; see also Paluck, supra note 13, at 582.
157. See supra Section I.B.2.
158. See 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
159. See SHERIF & SHERIF, supra note 116, at 202; Sechrist & Stangor, supra note
15, at 646.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See generally Deborah J. Terry & Michael Hogg, Group Norms and the Attitude-Behavior Relationship: A Role for Group Identification, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 776 (1996).
162. See id.
163. See FOREMOST INSURANCE GROUP, supra note 91, at 5.
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solidarity as a group and the tendency to conform to the apparent norm of other
landlords. Publication of a discriminatory statement may also strengthen its
normative impact. Publication suggests that the publisher, or the publication’s
readership, share the norm or at least do not disagree strongly enough to refuse
the advertisement.
By regulating housing advertisements and publications, the FHA artificially constrains the appearance of discriminatory norms.164 The fact that the
FHA creates an inaccurate representation of the frequency of prejudice and
discrimination may not be a weakness but rather a strength of the provision.
As the experiments discussed in Part II reveal, a listener’s perception of a social
norm is more important than the actual social norm.165 By the same token, the
social norms research supports regulating only housing speech that listeners
will understand as expressing a preference based on group status.166 For example, where a landlord merely advertises that an apartment is well-suited to
one or two professional adults, as occurred in the Bader case discussed previously,167 it is less likely that such an ambiguous message will negatively affect
social norms regarding the protected group (or dissuade professional adults
with children from applying). Moreover, as discussed previously, enforcement
in such ambiguous cases may provoke backlash against fair housing efforts.168
The power of perceived norms is evident in other areas of law as well.
Writing about tax compliance, Dan Kahan notes that “an individual’s perception of the extent of evasion powerfully predicts compliance behavior: the
higher an individual believes the rate of tax cheating to be, the more likely he
or she is to cheat too.”169 Tax compliance increases following interactions with
others who express a positive attitude toward tax laws and their intention to
comply and decreases following interactions with those who express negative

164. Research indicates that while racial and certain other forms of bias have decreased, people retain more subtle preferences not to associate closely with other
groups. See, e.g., Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 560
(1980); Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 314, 314–35 (2009) (reviewing research literature on subtle biases and racism).
165. See ALAN D. BERKOWITZ, THE SOCIAL NORMS APPROACH: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 5 (2004), http://www.alanberkowitz.com/articles/social_norms.pdf.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
168. The press account of the fair housing enforcement against Bader suggests a
degree of public upset and backlash against fair housing over-reach. See supra notes
69–72 and accompanying text.
169. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 81 (2003).
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attitudes and disclination to comply.170 A study by the Minnesota Department
of Revenue found that taxpayers who received a letter stating that tax compliance was much higher than what citizens generally estimate subsequently reported more income and fewer deductions than taxpayers who received a letter
indicating an increased risk of audit.171
What about buyers, tenants, and borrowers exposed to discriminatory advertisements? Exposure to communications indicating prejudice can affect the
norms of these listeners as well. There is some research suggesting that increases in prejudice can occur even when the person receiving the prejudiced
or discriminatory message is a member of the group being discriminated
against.172 The research on the reactions of members of “stigmatized groups”
to prejudiced communications is still preliminary, and further investigation is
needed before we can draw definitive conclusions.173 At a minimum, it is evident that buyers, tenants, and borrowers from protected groups who read or
hear about advertisements discriminating against their group will perceive discrimination norms as more prevalent than they would have otherwise. This is
likely to affect where they look for housing and the types of landlords or sellers
they prefer – indeed, this may be the cause of some of the “self-sorting” by race
observed in the research literature.174
The normative impact of discriminatory housing speech extends beyond
members of protected groups to affect others exposed, directly and indirectly,
to such messages. The ill effects are worsened by the tendency of stereotypes
and prejudice to spread across social networks. Social networks are the constellations of direct and indirect ties that connect people to each other and to
cultural beliefs and information.175 For example, researchers have found in
field studies that recent migrants to New York City who met anti-Semitic people became more anti-Semitic.176 Another study found that white southern men
in the 1950s who entered the comparatively more egalitarian environment of
the army became less prejudiced against African-Americans.177 The transference of social norms is also apparent in the startlingly high degree of social
accord about stereotypes. Stereotypes are the characteristics people believe to
be representative of different groups.178 In most cases, people hold stereotypes
170. See Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform
Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE
PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 9 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
171. Id. at 214.
172. See generally Crosby et al., supra note 164.
173. See Part IV.
174. See generally, e.g., Massey, supra note 28.
175. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 202 (1983).
176. Jeanne Watson, Some Social and Psychological Situations Related to Change
in Attitude, 3 HUMAN RELATIONS 15, 15, 47 (1950).
177. Pettigrew, Regional Differences, supra note 118, at 30.
178. Marvin Karlins et al., On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three
Generations of College Students, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1969).
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even though they have had minimal or no contact with the stereotyped group,
which suggests that those stereotypes are the result of culture and not personal
experience.179
In addition to social norms, cognitive dissonance plays a role in the prejudice-altering effects of housing speech. Research on cognitive dissonance
shows that eliciting an initial cognition or action, even when it is involuntary,
increases the likelihood that individuals will strive to reduce dissonance by
making subsequent thoughts, attitudes, or behaviors consonant with the elicited
position.180 Laws mandating non-discriminatory advertisements and statements make it more likely that speakers will subsequently behave in an egalitarian manner.

B. Oral Statements
In addition to written advertisements and notices, the FHA also forbids
discriminatory oral statements. For example, a landlord cannot lawfully tell a
family, “I never rent to families with children under the age of five.” In addition to blocking or dissuading the home seeker from the transaction at hand,
discriminatory oral statements can also affect whether the listener subsequently
explores housing options in the same neighborhoods or with sellers or landlords with similar characteristics to the discriminatory speaker. A home seeker
may view landlords and sellers in the area as members of the same group and
assume that bias is shared by the group. Moreover, as noted previously, perceptions of discrimination tend to spread. People may discuss a discriminatory
incident with those in their social network who may in turn share the information with others.181
While discriminatory advertisements that reach wide audiences usually
have the greatest impact on norms, the psychology research demonstrates that
a single oral statement can also affect social norms of prejudice. Investigating
the effect of racial slurs, Jeff Greenberg and Tom Pyszczynski found that participants who received vignettes about either an African-American or a white
person winning a debate and then overhead a single racial slur subsequently
rated the skills of the African-American debater who lost more negatively than

179. See id.
180. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–10 (1957); see

also Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay
Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 78 (John C.
Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (“One likely consequence of such behavior
change [as a result of anti-discrimination statutes] is attitude change: People who are
required to act in a non-prejudiced manner may subsequently change their attitudes as
well.”).
181. See Section II.A.
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participants who overhead a neutral remark or nothing.182 There is also evidence that exposure to a prejudiced norm can increase the listener’s prejudice
against the targeted group even when the listener is part of that group.183 While
the normative effect of discriminatory oral statements is more incremental than
publications, the effect of oral statements on norms is nonetheless substantial
and troubling, as are its direct effects on housing opportunities.184
For both oral statements and written advertisements, a social norms model
does not resolve the free speech tensions over § 3604(c) but rather raises new
questions. In particular, the research on the effect of hearing discriminatory or
prejudiced statements on listeners’ willingness to express prejudice – and possibly on internal beliefs – creates complexity for the view of the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace of ideas and the assumption that contrary
points of view will be readily forthcoming.185 This is not meant as an argument
against First Amendment rights, which protect a range of interests in liberty,
discourse, citizenship, and information, but rather an acknowledgement that
the psychology research unsettles certain assumptions about the effects of free
speech.186 Full discussion of the implications of social norms research for the
First Amendment is an important undertaking, but it is one beyond the scope
of this Article. As a doctrinal matter, § 3604(c) does not require us to resolve
these questions and tensions. The case law has firmly established that discriminatory housing speech is not protected commercial speech because it relates
to an illegal activity.187

182. See Jeff Greenberg & Tom Pyszczynski, The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic
Slur on Evaluations of the Target: How to Spread a Social Disease, 21 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 61, 61–70 (1985).
183. Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized Stigmatize? The Ironic Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group PrejudiceExpression Norms, 95 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 877 (2008) (concluding that perception that the majority norm is discriminatory appears to increase discrimination by racial and ethnic minorities).
184. In other work, I have discussed the negative effects of discriminatory oral
statements in producing “stereotype threat,” meaning the tendency of members of stereotyped groups to show impairments in performance after exposure to stereotypes suggesting lower competence in that area by their group. See Stern & Lewinsohn-Zamir,
supra note 13.
185. The marketplace of ideas for the First Amendment has origins over a century
old. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
186. Another extension of the psychology research is that, from a psychological
standpoint, more moderate discriminatory speech may be more damaging to norms than
extreme hate speech, which is likely to be perceived by listeners as an outlier view.
187. See supra Section I.B.1.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/7

28

Stern: A Social Norm Theory of Regulating Housing Speech Under the Fair

2019]

A SOCIAL NORM THEORY OF REGULATING HOUSING

463

C. Effects on Different Groups Protected Under the Fair Housing Act
There is some evidence that the kind of norm and its clarity affect the
magnitude of norm-induced attitude and behavior change from discriminatory
statements. A study by Margo Monteith and co-researchers found that participants conformed to the normative stance of an experimenter posing as a bystander when that person expressed egalitarian opinions about African-Americans and gays but not prejudiced ones.188 Monteith concluded that this finding
is due to the strong social norm, evidenced in much survey research, against
expressing bias toward African-Americans and gay people.189
It is not certain how this finding translates to the context of fair housing.
Contrary to the conclusion of Monteith and her co-researchers, discriminatory
housing speech may have a greater prejudice-enhancing effect if listeners view
housing discrimination as a more socially acceptable form of prejudice.190
Also the research findings are mixed, with some research finding that exposure
to prejudiced norms shifts listeners’ attitudes in a consonant direction but less
robustly than exposure to tolerant norms. The study by Zitek and Hebl discussed previously found that people were more strongly influenced by communications about ambiguous norms than well-established norms.191 In their
study, participants responded to a survey about discrimination against one of
five different groups after hearing the responses of another participant who was
actually a confederate planted by the experimenters.192 The confederate’s normative influence was much stronger when the survey addressed ambiguous,
low clarity norms, such as discrimination against ex-convicts, than when the
survey asked identical questions about African-American, gay, and obese individuals – groups associated with stronger anti-discrimination norms.193
If conformity increases when norms are less crystalline, regulating discriminatory housing statements may have the strongest impact when strong
anti-discrimination norms do not attach to particular protected group. Families
with children offer a paradigm example; people with disabilities likely do as
well. Discrimination against these groups is more common and tolerated in
our society. In contrast, abundant survey and experimental research, including
a measure developed by Zitek and Hebl, find robust social norms against discriminating against minority racial groups and to a somewhat lesser degree gay
188. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267. She interpreted this finding to indicate that “hearing nonprejudiced expressions served to activate a powerful
social norm suggesting that one should not be prejudiced [and] . . . the social norm
favoring prejudice is not, at present, as strong as the norm opposing prejudice.” Id. at
283; see also Walker, Sinclair & MacArthur, supra note 154, at 65–66 (finding that
pro-gay rights norms induced more attitude and behavior change than anti-gay rights
norms).
189. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267.
190. See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 993–94.
191. See Zitek & Hebl, supra note 143, at 867–70.
192. Id. at 870.
193. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

464

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

individuals.194 This does not mean that people lack prejudice toward these
groups but rather that there is social pressure not to express it overtly.195 Although the research is too limited to be certain, it seems likely that prohibiting
discriminatory housing statements regarding low clarity norms (e.g., discriminating against families) will have particularly strong, and needed, prejudicereducing effects.

D. Social Norms and the Fair Housing Act’s Goal of Integration
Social norms affect whether landlords, sellers, and others eschew discriminatory conduct, the willingness to transact between different groups, and the
extent to which house hunters view neighborhoods as tolerant. All of these
effects promote integration – a goal that was at the heart of the work of the
Kerner Commission in advocating legislation and the FHA’s passage.196 In
view of the FHA’s major goal of integration, it seems likely that the enactors
had something akin to social norms in mind when they crafted § 3604(c).197 At
the time, discriminatory housing advertisements and notices against blacks
were ubiquitous and segregation was a pressing issue as alarm over black ghettoes burgeoned.198 It would not require a mental leap for legislators to realize
that the frequency of discriminatory housing speech bolstered its social acceptability and thwarted residential integration by discouraging applicants from targeted groups from seeking housing in certain areas.
The legislative history does not illuminate the degree to which the House
and Senate apprehended the normative force of § 3604(c) at the time it was
enacted.199 In fact, the legislative history does not explain the impetus for
§ 3604(c) at all except to record that Congress felt that Title VII should be the
starting place for crafting the FHA.200 However, as noted above, given the
social context and prevalence of housing discrimination at the time of the
FHA’s passage, it seems likely that its supporters intuited that discriminatory
statements and advertisements would undermine the goal of integration by cultivating the impression of widespread prejudice. In a similar vein, the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the FHA’s critical mission of

194. Id. at 870; see also Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267.
195. See Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-

Interest, 66(5) J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882, 889-90 (1994) (describing
how social norms and egalitarian values suppress overt racism while weaker social
norms against anti-fat prejudice offer less constraint on the expression of anti-fat sentiments) [hereinafter Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice]; Crandall, Social Norms, supra note
13, at 362–64.
196. Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 362–64.
197. See 114 Cong. Rec. 2276, 3422, 9559, & 9591 (1968); see also supra Part I.
198. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 212–13.
199. Id. at 199, 204–11.
200. See id. at 207–08.
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promoting residential integration in interpreting § 3604(c) and other FHA provisions.201

IV. REVISITING SOME PUZZLES OF SECTION 3604(C)
Section 3604(c) of the FHA embodies both paradoxes and controversies.
A social norms model of housing speech regulation illuminates some of these
puzzles and offers compelling justifications for seemingly anomalous aspects
of § 3604(c). This Part considers how social norms support § 3604(c)’s lack
of an intent requirement, the inapplicability of exemptions that shield defendants from other provisions of the FHA, and standing rules for discriminatory
housing speech claims.

A. Intent
Section 3604(c) is unusual within anti-discrimination law because it imposes liability without a requirement that the plaintiff establish the defendant’s
intent.202 The statutory language requires only that the housing statement, notice, or advertisement “indicates” discrimination or preference based on a protected status.203 Other provisions of the FHA require that discriminatory refusal to rent or sell or discrimination in the terms and conditions of a housing
transaction occurred “because of” the protected status.204 Courts have consistently interpreted this language to mean that an “ordinary listener or reader” test
applies to determine whether housing speech violates the FHA.205 In difficult
cases, where the language used in the statement is ambiguous and the ordinary
listener standard hard to apply, courts have considered evidence of intent to
adjudicate § 3604(c) claims.206 As the court in Soules v. HUD explained, courts
may look to intent in § 3604(c) claims “not because a lack of design constitutes
an affirmative defense to an FHA violation [] but because it helps determine
the manner in which a statement was made and the way an ordinary [reader]
would have interpreted it.”207
201. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (suggesting
the importance of integration by upholding standing for white residents of an apartment
complex to sue for their landlord’s racial discrimination against African-American applicants based on their injuries from segregation); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018).
203. Id.
204. Id.§ 3604(a); id. § 3604(b); id.§ 3604(d); id. § 3605(a).
205. See, e.g., Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995); Soules v. HUD,
967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972).
206. See, e.g., Soules, 967 F.2d at 825; Mancuso v. Douglas Elliman, LLC, 808 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Maziarz v. Hous. Auth. of the Town of Vernon,
281 F.R.D. 71, 78 (D. Conn. 2012).
207. 967 F.2d at 825.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

466

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

While an ordinary listener standard is unusual from the perspective of
discrimination law, it is unsurprising from the vantage point of social norms.
A standard that focuses on the ordinary reader or listener rather than the
speaker’s intent better captures the injury to norms. If an average individual
who reads an advertisement or hears a housing statement finds that the housing
speech indicates a preference based on membership in a protected group, then
that statement is likely to affect social norms. The standard of the speaker’s
intent, on the other hand, does not closely track normative effects on listeners.
At times, the case law seems to allude to norms when it elaborates on the ordinary listener/reader standard. In Ragin v. New York Times Co., the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified that the ordinary reader “is neither
the most suspicious nor the most insensitive of our citizenry.”208 Viewed from
a normative perspective, this holding eschews a focus on outliers and instead
captures statements that activate more widespread norms.
The ordinary listener or reader standard expands § 3604(c)’s function
from remedying individual psychic injury to also addressing normative harms.
Accordingly, most cases refer to a generic ordinary reader or listener. However, the Second Circuit has stated that the statutory test is whether an advertisement “would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular [protected group]
from answering it.”209 A social norms perspective favors the former approach
of an unspecified ordinary reader or listener rather than an ordinary reader or
listener from a specific protected group. As the social norms research makes
clear, the impact of discriminatory advertisements on ordinary readers and listeners from non-protected groups is substantial.
It may seem unfair to impose liability on defendants for statements they
did not intend as discriminatory. Multiple factors counteract this concern.
First, unintentional discrimination is particularly likely to involve ambiguous
and opaque statements (in contrast, one who writes “no blacks” in their housing
advertisement can hardly claim lack of intent to discriminate). Given the limited resources for FHA enforcement, unequivocal discriminatory housing
speech is more likely to be subject to a complaint or prosecution than ambiguous, possibly unintentional claims. Second, in complaints and actions by HUD,
the government must seek “conciliation . . . to the extent feasible.”210 Although
settlement negotiations are not required for suits brought by private parties,
voluntary settlement often has attractions for both sides (particularly for defendants who do not have insurance policies to indemnify their legal expenses).
Third, we must weigh potential unfairness to defendants under the current,
strict liability approach against the consequences of an intent-based standard.
Exempting unintentional statements, or those in a gray area of partial or confused intent, would stymie litigation with difficult-to-resolve questions of intent and create incentives for landlords and sellers to use thinly veiled statements and then claim lack of intent. It would make it exceedingly hard for
208. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002.
209. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999–1000.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(1) (2018); 24 C.F.R. § 103.300(a) (2012).
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plaintiffs to prevail on § 3604(c) claims. These results would undermine
§ 3604(c)’s capacity to promote open residential markets and cultivate nondiscriminatory norms.

B. Exemptions: The Psychology of a Single Statement
A puzzle of the FHA is the fact that numerous exemptions to liability
apply to discriminatory acts but not to discriminatory statements or publications. As discussed in Part I, § 3604(c) is not subject to the exemptions for
Mrs. Murphys who own and occupy housing of four units or less; sellers or
landlords who do not own more than three single-family homes and do not use
a real estate broker or agent; and private clubs and religious organizations.211
It is not immediately evident why these owners should be able to lawfully discriminate but not lawfully advertise their intentions. Some aspects of the exemptions, such as the inapplicability of some provisions of the FHA to owners
of single-family homes who do not use a real estate agent, suggest a concern
in part with the burden on owners who lack legal expertise to comply with the
FHA.212 Presumably, however, these owners are similarly challenged to ascertain and understand § 3604(c)’s prohibition of discriminatory statements and
publications.
A social norms model of § 3604(c) offers a fresh perspective on the question of exemptions. The broad applicability of housing statement regulation is
necessary to prevent norm dilution. Norms represent a consensus – or, more
accurately, a perceived consensus – within a group. Even a small number of
dissonant statements can muddy the norm, rendering it ineffective. Psychology
studies have found that one instance of a person expressing a racist, or antiracist, view can affect or activate social norms. For example, in a 1994 study
by Fletcher Blanchard, Christian Crandall, John Brigham, and Leigh Ann
Vaughn, participants who heard the ratings of an experimenter posing as a survey participant (a confederate) on how the campus should respond to racial
harassment altered their responses in line with those of the confederate.213 This
effect occurred with both African-American and white confederates; it also occurred when participants responded to the survey privately as well as publicly.214 A subsequent study by Margo Monteith, Nicole Deneen, and Gregory
Tooman using a similar experimental design replicated the normative effect of
hearing a single confederate condemn discrimination on participants’ responses to survey scenarios depicting discrimination against African-Americans and gay men.215 Even mere overhearing can affect perceptions. A study
211.
212.
213.
214.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1); id. § 3603(b)(2); id. § 3607(a).
See id. § 3603(b)(1).
See Blanchard et al., supra note 13, at 995–96.
See id. at 995. Following the statement of the confederate condemning racism,
participants who responded publicly condemned racism more strongly than private responders. See id.
215. Monteith, Deneen & Tooman, supra note 13, at 267.
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by Eaaron Henderson-King and Richard Nisbett found that white participants
who overheard a nearby confederate talking on a phone about a recent violent
robbery committed by an African-American were more likely to rate AfricanAmericans as hostile and antagonistic.216
The research showing that a single statement can alter prejudiced responses and behaviors underscores the importance of comprehensive regulation of housing speech. Discriminatory refusals to sell or rent and other actions
prohibited under the FHA can increase prejudiced norms as well. Although
the courts have interpreted exemptions restrictively in practice, it remains true
that a number of claims cannot proceed or are never brought because the defendant falls within an exempted category.217 Were these exemptions to apply
to § 3604(c), it is likely that there would be a high number of discriminatory
statements in printed notices and advertisements and some increase in discriminatory oral statements as well. If a single statement can shape prejudice and
discrimination, the prospect of many advertisements indicating that others discriminate is sobering. Indeed, this concerning situation is occurring with internet housing advertisements, which have been partially shielded from fair
housing liability under the more recently-enacted CDA. As a result, online
advertisements feature discriminatory statements far more often than print media.218

C. Standing
Social norms also lend support to the expansive standing to bring suit for
violation of § 3604(c) and other provisions of the FHA. The FHA empowers
an “aggrieved person” to bring suit privately or file an administrative complaint
with HUD.219 In a § 3604(c) suit, a member of a protected group can sue for
emotional and psychological damages caused by a discriminatory housing
statement (though not for the loss of the housing unit itself).220 In addition, a
wide range of other plaintiffs can bring suit. The United States Supreme Court
has defined standing broadly, holding that the FHA’s private enforcement and
administrative investigation provisions reveal Congress’ intention “to define
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.”221
Prudential limitations, such as requirements that a party raise his or her
own grievance and not the grievances of others and the rule barring suits alleging generalized grievances, are also relaxed in FHA claims.222 In Gladstone
216. See Eaaron I. Henderson-King & Richard E. Nisbett, Anti-Black Prejudice as
a Function of Exposure to the Negative Behavior of a Single Black Person, 71 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 654, 661–62 (1996).
217. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 196 n.31.
218. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–80; see also infra Section VI.A.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2018); id. § 3613 (a)(1)(A).
220. See Schwemm, supra note 5, at 241.
221. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
222. See e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
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Realtors v. City of Bellwood, the United States Supreme Court held that any
person or entity can bring suit for housing discrimination that violates someone’s rights so long as the person suing has been “genuinely injured.”223 Residents and localities have sued for injury from segregation, and fair housing
organizations have sued for housing statements and other discrimination
against “testers” who pose as home seekers.224 These decisions have greatly
aided enforcement of the FHA by empowering fair housing advocacy organizations and a wide range of other private parties to bring suit.225
This does not mean standing is without bounds. While standing doctrine
in FHA suits remains generous on the whole, there are hints of increasing restrictiveness. The recent United States Supreme Court case of Bank of America
Corp. v. City of Miami held that while the City was an “aggrieved person”
under the FHA for its claims that Bank of America had engaged in racially
discriminatory lending, the City failed to show the proximate cause required
by the FHA to recover damages.226 The Court held that the plaintiff must do
more than show that its alleged injury foreseeably flowed from the defendant’s
conduct and instead show a direct relation between the injury asserted and the
alleged discriminatory housing practices.227 In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit declined to extend standing to a resident suing the county
recorder for violating the FHA and civil rights statutes by maintaining real estate records containing racially restrictive covenants.228 The court held that the
plaintiff had not suffered an actual or threatened injury because he did not allege an intent to buy or rent property and, even if he had, the restrictive covenants were no longer valid or enforceable.229 Merely alleging that the racially
restrictive covenants discouraged him from purchasing real estate and created
a feeling that he and others were not welcome was not sufficient to confer
standing.230
To be clear, this Article does not assert that social norms should dictate
standing doctrine as a general matter – such a move runs the risk of collapsing
standing as a doctrine of restriction. Instead, it considers the narrower point of
the inter-relationship between standing under the FHA and a conception of injury to social norms. In the case of the FHA, the jurisprudence already extends
capacious, although not unlimited, standing. A social norms model of
§ 3604(c) does not change this result. Rather it offers a new way of understanding expansive standing decisions and additional support for extending
standing in disputed cases. In addition to psychic injury to members of pro-

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
See id. at 94.
See Schwemm, supra note 99, at 382–83.
137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017).
See id. at 1311.
Mason v. Adams Cty. Recorder, 901 F.3d 753 (2018).
Id. at 755–57.
Id.
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tected groups or harms to integration from truncated housing searches, discriminatory housing statements cause harms to listeners’ social norms. These
norms in turn are likely to negatively affect attitudes and behaviors and impede
the goal of integration.

V. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL NORMS
Richard McAdams, the leading legal scholar of social norms, has wisely
observed that social norms have both potential and limitations for law.231 Similarly, the power of social norms in housing speech regulation is subject to constraints as well as concerns about unintended consequences. This Part of the
Article discusses these limitations and briefly considers some of the alternatives to norm-based intervention.
First, prohibiting discriminatory housing statements in furtherance of
egalitarian norms may have unintended consequences. For example, in the
employment context, a recent study found that state legislation prohibiting employers from inquiring about criminal history substantially decreased the number of young, uneducated African-American and Latino men interviewed and
hired.232 More research is needed to ascertain how home seekers react when
the discriminatory preferences of other parties to the transaction are revealed
versus hidden. Absent statements revealing a seller’s or landlord’s preferences,
it is possible that home seekers will focus their search in localities and neighborhoods where their group predominates in an effort to avoid unpleasant rejections.
Faced with prohibitions on discriminatory housing speech, landlords,
sellers, and lenders may shift to more covert forms of expressing discriminatory preferences. As discussed previously, following the enactment of
§ 3604(c), developers and landlords tried to use only white models in order to
signal preferences; case law now restricts such conduct.233 There have been
contentions in the legal scholarship that developers use certain amenities, such
as golf courses, to discourage African-Americans.234 Despite these possibilities for evasion, § 3604(c) still conveys benefits by raising the cost of communicating discriminatory housing preferences.235 Covert signals, such as residential amenities, are a costlier and less reliable way of effecting discrimination than bald statements that certain groups are not welcome.
231. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND
LIMITS 1–15 (2015); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1543–45 (2000).
232. See Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of
“Ban the Box”: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal
Histories Are Hidden 16–20 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://jenniferdoleac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Doleac_Hansen_BanTheBox.pdf.
233. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
234. See Strahilevitz, supra note 107, at 450–79; see also supra Section I.B.
235. Even if the FHA did not regulate housing speech at all, property owners might
still use amenities and other, more covert signals to communicate preferences. Outright
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Second, perhaps it is paternalistic for the government to attempt to change
people’s attitudes and preferences by artificially constraining housing
speech.236 This concern is endemic to a wide range of psychological interventions and behavioral “nudges.”237 In the case of social norms, it is not so evident that § 3604(c) has altered underlying preferences. Recall that some experiments have found that perceptions of norms changed following egalitarian
communications but not personal beliefs.238 Virtually all of the psychology
experiments use self-report measures that the participants know will be read by
the experimenters. Participants may not be confident that their responses will
remain anonymous. As Crandall observes, “[W]hen using self-report techniques to measure racial attitudes, social norms about public behavior, egalitarian values, and social desirability concerns all contaminate the process.”239
Thus, a normative theory of housing speech regulation may not implicate the
classic concern of government manipulating beliefs and preferences. However, regulation of housing speech does influence norms and, in some instances, behaviors. This is also true of a decision by the government not to
regulate housing speech. The omission of housing speech regulation also affects norms and behaviors with respect to prejudice and housing discrimination. It is unclear why the former should be considered paternalistic while the
latter is deemed liberty-regarding.
Third, one might reasonably ask, if communicating non-discriminatory
social norms for housing transactions is effective, then why does prejudice and
residential segregation remain a challenge?240 The contention in this Article is
not that social norms eliminate housing discrimination but that they reduce it.
expressions of prejudice are normatively objectionable to most Americans even in the
absence of laws forbidding such statements. See e.g., Charles E. Case & Andrew M.
Greeley, Attitudes Toward Racial Equality, 16 HUMBOLDT J. OF SOC. RELATIONS 67,
67 (1990); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism: Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 1, 1–10 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
1986).
236. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1171 (“At the level of the individual, it is fairly
paternalistic to use the law as a tool to encourage a person to change his preferences by
preventing him from articulating them . . . .”).
237. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1033, 1059–60 (2012); Robert Sugden, On Nudging: A Review of Nudge: Improving
Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, 16 INT. J. OF THE ECON. OF BUS. 365, 367, 370 (2009); see also Gary M. Lucas,
Jr., Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government’s Use of Negative Emotions to
Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 227, 257–62 (2013).
238. See, e.g., Paluck, supra note 13, at 582.
239. See Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice, supra note 195, at 889.
240. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 28, at 581–82. Massey recently concluded, “Despite some signs of progress toward a more integrated society, the pace of desegregation
has been quite uneven and 46 years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act many
areas remain just as [racially] segregated as they were in 1968.” Id.
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There is evidence that residential segregation has decreased significantly since
the passage of the FHA.241 There is also evidence that racial and ethnic prejudice has declined on surveys, with overwhelming majorities rejecting prejudice
and discrimination against African-Americans and other racial minorities.242
“Subtle racism” or unconscious bias in interpersonal interactions, employment,
and other settings has substantially displaced overt bias and hostility.243 One
theory offered to explain these results is that people repress racism in accordance with social norms sanctioning it.244 Although this falls short of true egalitarianism, a change in the norms of expressing prejudice is nonetheless beneficial for reducing discrimination in housing transactions. While it is impossible to attribute reductions in overt prejudice to any one provision or law, at a
minimum these findings are consistent with a theory of normative gains from
housing speech and other civil rights regulation.
Fourth, another possible objection is that the altering social norms may
not redress important forms of direct housing discrimination. For example,
while prohibiting discriminatory housing statements promotes non-discriminatory social norms, it does nothing for the individual who answers a facially
non-discriminatory advertisement only to find that a small-scale landlord may
lawfully discriminate against him.245 The contention of this Article is not that
social norms can solve all manner of fair housing law ills, replace the FHA’s
241. Edward Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, MANHATTAN INS. FOR POL’Y
RES. (Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/end-segregated-century-racial-separation-americas-neighborhoods-1890-2010-5848.html. While racial
segregation does appear to have decreased, the magnitude of the effect depends on how
researchers define segregation. See Ray Sin & Maria Krysan, What Is Racial Residential Integration? A Research Synthesis, 1950–2013, 14 SOC. OF RACE & ETHNICITY 467,
472–73 (2015) (suggesting Glaeser and Vigdor’s strong finding of integration was partially due to defining integration as black-nonblack rather than black-white residential
proximity).
242. See e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 235, at 1–10; Case & Greeley, supra
note 235, at 67.
243. Crosby et al., supra note 164, at 546; see also Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner,
supra note 164, at 314–35 (reviewing research literature on subtle biases and racism).
244. Crosby et al., supra note 164, at 559; see also Crandall, Anti-Fat Prejudice,
supra note 195, at 889 (concluding that “whether positive or negative behaviors [toward
African-Americans] are carried out usually depends on the social norms about the expression of racism.”). As psychologist Crandall and his co-researchers observe, “Although it may be encouraging that survey reports of prejudice are on the decline, these
reports may reflect conformity to social rules regarding appropriate behavior rather than
personal values and beliefs.” Crandall, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 360.
245. A number of scholars have criticized the Mrs. Murphy exemption legalizing
discrimination and maintaining segregation. See, e.g., Marie Failinger, Remembering
Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and
Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 383–85 (2001); James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing
Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 605, 605–10 (1999).
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prohibitions on discriminatory refusal to rent, sell, or lend, or justify exemptions from the FHA. Rather, it is that social norms are a powerful complement
to other rules and policies.
Last, unanswered questions and data gaps are a limitation of a social
norms theory of housing speech regulation. In particular, it would be helpful
to have research on communications and social norms specific to housing and
various types of real estate transactions (e.g., roommate, small-scale landlord,
sales, lending). To date, the bulk of the research on social norms has assessed
other contexts, such as jury trials, employment, and dating, but not housing.246
There are also substantial gaps in understanding the psychological processes
that mediate the response to social norms.247 For example, we do not know
whether persuasion techniques deplete resources for self-regulation (i.e., altering behavior in the face of preferred, automatic, or low-cost alternatives). Depleting cognitive resources may make people more likely to conform to certain
norms, particularly those that convey information about the frequency or likelihood of a behavior.248 This is highly relevant to the context of housing transactions, which, like any commercial transaction, typically entail attempts at
persuasion and manipulation (e.g., framing information, manipulating order of
presentation, and obscuring negative pricing information).249 Additionally,
there are data gaps on individual variability in response to social norms and the
reactions of different groups to normative information.250 For example, there
is limited research addressing the effect of communications and consensus information on the attitudes of racial minorities and members of other “stigmatized groups.”251
Despite these limitations, social norms play an important role in redressing housing discrimination and promoting integration. The benefits of shifting
social norms via housing speech come into sharper focus when one compares
246. See, e.g., Wittenbrink & Henley, supra note 129, at 598; Crandall, Social
Norms, supra note 13, at 364.
247. See, e.g., Ryan P. Jacobson, Chad R. Mortensen & Robert B. Cialdini, Bodies
Obliged and Unbound: Differentiated Response Tendencies for Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms, 100 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 433, 433 (2010).
248. See id. at 434–35, 442–46 (finding that the hypothesized increase in conformity to descriptive norms in the depletion condition was present but was not statistically
significant). Other research has shown that people have a reduced capacity to regulate
themselves following exposure to persuasion techniques such as the foot-in-the-door
technique and greater vulnerability to subsequent persuasion techniques. See Bob M.
Fennis, Loes Janssen & Kathleen D. Vohs, Acts of Benevolence: A Limited-Resource
Account of Compliance with Charitable Requests, 35 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 906, 906–
10 (2009).
249. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 758 (2006).
250. But see Walker, Sinclair & MacArthur, supra note 154, at 64–66.
251. But see Shapiro & Neuberg, supra note 183, at 877 (concluding that perception
that the majority norm is discriminatory appears to increase discrimination by racial
and ethnic minorities).
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the alternatives. Rules that prohibit acts of discrimination have high enforcement costs due to the decentralized nature of housing.252 In comparison, at
least some § 3604(c) cases can be brought by fair housing organizations perusing advertisements.253 Because fair housing organizations, as well as publishers who are liable for violations, review print housing advertisements, reporting by an individual victim is often not necessary to prevent or redress discriminatory housing speech. In contrast, substantive discrimination, such as experiencing a refusal to rent based on ethnicity, often requires that the victims of
the discrimination report what is typically an unpleasant and humiliating experience. Research in both psychology and law shows that victims of acts of
discrimination under-report.254 This likely occurs in part because people who
report discrimination are rated negatively by others. Empirical work finds that
people view those who complain about discrimination as sensitive, irritating,
and troublemakers.255 Not surprisingly, individuals who pursue anti-discrimination suits have a much lower likelihood of succeeding in court than other
types of litigants.256 In response to these obstacles, fair housing organizations
have hired “testers” who pose as housing applicants and report violations.257
Yet, use of testers is resource-intensive and can only reach a tiny fraction of
housing discrimination.258
Social norm interventions have been successful at reducing prejudice, or
at least its expression, compared to other psychological strategies. In general,
strategies to combat bias and discrimination have proven difficult to engineer.
For example, a recent study by Calvin Lai and co-researchers tested seventeen
interventions and found that none durably reduced bias.259 As discussed in Part
252. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1100 (1989).
253. Crossett, supra note 24, at 211; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174.
254. See, e.g., HUD, DO WE KNOW MORE NOW? TRENDS IN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE,
SUPPORT, AND USE OF FAIR HOUSING LAW iii (2006), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/hsgfin/FairHsngSurvey.html.
255. See Cheryl. R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP GROUP PROCESSES & RELS. 227, 229 (2003); Cheryl. R. Kaiser & Carol
T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 254 (2001).
256. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits
of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1333, 1342–45 (2012) (arguing
that claims that do not directly evoke discrimination, like just cause or infliction of
emotional stress, may be more effective routes to plaintiffs due to the prejudice against
them).
257. See Freiberg, supra note 46, at 240–48.
258. Id. at 247.
259. In this “intervention contest,” none of the interventions reduced explicit bias,
and only half had any effect on reducing automatic, unconscious bias measured by the
IAT. See Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative
Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1765, 1765
(2014). When the researchers re-measured several days later, even those modest effects
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II, there is evidence that social norms can reduce the expression of prejudice
and can do so in situations where other strategies have proven difficult to implement successfully.
For example, historically both law and psychology have envisioned contact between members of different groups as the remedy for prejudice and discrimination.260 Yet, direct intergroup contact has limitations to its ability to
reduce prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.261 Contact with people
from other groups tends to reduce prejudice, but it does not invariably do so.262
The magnitude of prejudice reduction from inter-group contact is higher when
the contact is voluntary and under conditions of equal status.263 If these conditions are difficult for psychologists to engineer in the lab, then it is that much
more difficult for housing agencies and programs that operate in private, capitalist housing markets. Accordingly, it is possible that laws that change the
perceived frequency of housing discrimination and prejudice may have an
equal, or greater, effect on opening housing markets than direct initiatives to
integrate neighborhoods.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT DEBATES IN FAIR HOUSING
The research on social norms offers a different perspective on controversies within fair housing law. The effect of communications on social norms
clarifies the multi-faceted nature of the harm from discriminatory housing
statements. Discriminatory housing statements not only injure members of
protected groups who hear them but also shape listeners’ and others’ prejudices
and their propensity to engage in discriminatory conduct. This shift in conceptualizing the nature of the harm from discriminatory statements is relevant to a
number of current debates. To illustrate, this Part of the Article briefly considers how social norms research informs (1) the conflict between the FHA and
the CDA and (2) debates over whether § 3604(c) should be applied to roommate advertisements.

had disappeared. Id. at 1782. The IAT measures how closely a participant associates
different concepts by measuring how quickly he or she categorizes two target concepts
(e.g., black, white) with an attribute (e.g., good, bad). Id. at 1782.
260. See supra notes 119–28.
261. See Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, supra note 13, at 486–87 (“Studying alternative
approaches to stereotype change is important because there are theoretical and practical
limitations to the assumption that stereotypes are changed primarily as a result of direct
intergroup contact.”).
262. See ALLPORT, supra note 127, at 1–10. Pettigrew and Tropp conducted a metaanalysis of studies on intergroup contact and found that contact decreased prejudice and
that Allport’s “optimal conditions” (e.g., voluntary contact, equal status) increased the
magnitude of this effect. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test
of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 751
(2006).
263. See Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 262, at 766.
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A. Communications Decency Act
Section 230 of the CDA protects online service providers from liability
for user-generated content posted on their sites.264 The CDA provides that
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”265 The CDA exempts federal criminal laws, intellectual property laws, and some privacy laws from this provision but does not exempt or
even mention the FHA.266 There is no indication that the enactors of the CDA
perceived the conflict with the FHA or considered its ramifications.
As a result, courts have been left to interpret FHA claims in light of the
CDA. In a key case, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights v.
Craigslist, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plain
language of the CDA established that Craigslist was not a publisher but a conduit for third party content.267 The website was merely posting content rather
than altering or creating it.268 Thus, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights
had no claim against Craigslist but could bring suit against individuals who
posted discriminatory housing advertisements on the Craigslist website.269 But
in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, Roommates.com created a
search function that prompted posters to list discriminatory preferences and
allowed them to filter potential roommates by various characteristics, some of
which are protected under the FHA.270 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the website became a publisher by virtue of helping to create
the discriminatory content and thus faced liability under the FHA.271 Given
the divergence in the case law, there is the possibility that a deepening circuit
split could garner United States Supreme Court review.272
Notably, the CDA does not shield individuals who post discriminatory
advertisements on websites.273 However, identifying individual posters is laborious and sometimes impossible.274 In many cases, websites do not collect
identifying information and some even promote anonymity by creating temporary, anonymous email addresses for each post.275 The CDA removes from fair
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
Id. § 230(c)(1).
Id. § 230(e).
519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 672.
See 521 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1166–68.
See Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The
Ninth Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against
Roommate-Matching Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 376–78 (2008).
273. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174.
274. Id. at 1174–75.
275. Id. at 1173; see also Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the
Internet: The Case for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 N.W.U. L.
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housing enforcement the far more efficient alternative of imposing liability on
internet service providers. Internet service providers who are liable have a
strong incentive to develop policies and systems to restrict discriminatory advertisements.
The lack of liability for online service providers has opened a significant
chasm in FHA enforcement, particularly as more housing advertisements go
online and eschew print media.276 This chasm threatens to undo some of the
positive gains from § 3604(c), including its benefits to social norms. Discriminatory advertisements on the Internet can spread prejudicial norms with unprecedented reach and rapidity, eroding the gains from § 3604(c)’s prohibition
of discriminatory housing speech in print media, television, and oral communications.
In response to the potential of the CDA to undermine § 3604(c), some
commentators have argued that Congress should amend the CDA to specifically exempt website operators from immunity for FHA claims.277 While this
would better safeguard fair housing and social norms, it may not be practicable
for websites that have thousands of advertisements flowing in daily or weekly.
Even a diligent website operation, when operating under high volume and rapid
posting by users, is bound to miss some discriminatory advertisements.278
Another option to reduce normative and other injuries from discriminatory housing statements online is a legal rule that looks to whether a website
has created a filtering and blocking system that is calculated to be effective,
and is in fact reasonably effective, at preventing discriminatory housing advertisements. For example, the website could create systems that automatically
block certain terms in housing or roommate advertisements, such as “kids,”
and create a warning that appears on the screen explaining that preferences or
limitations based on protected categories violate federal or state law.279 The
liability of the online service provider would hinge on the quality of the filtering and blocking process rather than on the publication of individual discriminatory advertisements. This approach could balance the interests of website

REV. 1471, 1494 (2008); Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting
Civil Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. the Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 805, 828 (2007) (proposing plaintiff-friendly discovery standards for unmasking posters in housing discrimination
suits).
276. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Newspaper Circulation Falls Sharply, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/business/media/31paper.html (describing decline in newspaper circulation as a result of the Internet).
277. See, e.g., Crossett, supra note 24, at 211; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174.
278. Of course, fair housing enforcers face the same, and in some respects steeper,
burdens. Fair housing organizations or private parties who wish to sue individual posters for § 3604(c) violations must comb through a high volume of advertisements and
complete legal discovery processes to unmask posters.
279. Cf. Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1174–76 (proposing exempting the FHA from the
CDA).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7

478

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

operators against the normative and other harms from discriminatory housing
speech.280

B. Discriminatory Roommate Advertisements
There has been significant debate about whether roommates should be
regulated under the FHA.281 The Mrs. Murphy exemption shields roommate
seekers who refuse applicants or alter the terms and conditions of the rental
based on protected characteristics.282 However, the exemption does not apply
to discriminatory housing statements under § 3604(c). Roommate seekers may
not lawfully place discriminatory advertisements or make discriminatory statements regarding the rental.283
Liability for roommate advertisements under § 3604(c) has generated
substantial controversy. Some commentators maintain that a roommate situation involves such close physical association and intimacy that it should not be
subject to the FHA in any way.284 Others reason that it makes little sense to
forbid discriminatory roommate advertisements and similar speech but allow
discriminatory refusals to rent.285 Fair housing scholar Rigel Oliveri argues
that not applying the exemptions to § 3604(c) runs counter to the widespread
belief that one can discriminate in roommate selection, violates norms of free
choice about intimate associations within our dwellings, and creates public
backlash.286 Perhaps the thorniest issue is whether roommates should be able
to advertise a gender preference in light of concerns about privacy, nudity, or
sexual assault.
The power of social norms to reduce the expression of prejudiced attitudes and promote egalitarian behavior offers a rejoinder to these critiques. A
proliferation of discriminatory roommate advertisements would create the perception of widespread prejudice and might deter roommate seekers from considering a range of potential roommates. One scholar argues that “it does little
good to conceal the existence of these preferences [for roommates based on
protected characteristics under the FHA].”287 Yet, an abundant body of social
science research suggests the contrary is true. There are significant benefits to
280. In addition, lowering the costs of prosecuting individual posters who discriminate would be helpful. This could be done through more plaintiff-friendly discovery
standards for FHA violations on the Internet. See Kurth, supra note 275, at 828.
281. See, e.g., Brenna R. McLaughlin, #AirbnbWhileBlack: Repealing the Fair
Housing Act’s Mrs. Murphy Exemption to Combat Racism on Airbnb, 2018 WIS. L.
REV. 149, 178–79; Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1153–67.
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2018).
283. Id. § 3604(c).
284. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J.
624, 687 (1980) (“[A]ny government intrusion on personal choice of living arrangements demands substantial justification . . . .”).
285. See Oliveri, supra note 5, at 1165.
286. Id. at 1162–64.
287. Id. at 1171.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/7

44

Stern: A Social Norm Theory of Regulating Housing Speech Under the Fair

2019]

A SOCIAL NORM THEORY OF REGULATING HOUSING

479

social norms and the expression of prejudice from prohibiting discriminatory
communications. Of course, as discussed previously, immunity under the
CDA for online service providers may have undone some of these gains. Removing liability under § 3604(c) for individuals seeking roommates, either on
the Internet or in other forums, would worsen this situation.
It is not clear why this result, with its increase in the appearance of prejudiced statements, is necessary. After all, under the current structure of the
FHA, the roommate-seeker is ultimately free to refuse a roommate or roommate rental so long as he or she avoids discriminatory statements.288 While
this may be frustrating or upsetting to both parties seeking a roommate, it is
questionable whether these effects outweigh the harms to social norms from
discriminatory advertisements. It is also possible that neutral advertisements
might lead a roommate-seeker to accept someone from a group he or she initially intended to avoid. This could, in turn, create the type of “contact” and
interaction that psychologists have found to sometimes reduce prejudice.289

CONCLUSION
The psychology of social norms suggests a critical, yet often overlooked,
purpose of housing speech regulation: to promote norms against expressing
prejudice and against discrimination. The social norms research casts the
FHA’s surprising prohibition on discriminatory housing statements in a fresh
light. Communication of a norm or consensus viewpoint can affect listeners’
attitudes, willingness to express prejudice, and discriminatory behavior. As a
result, discriminatory housing speech is not mere talk or injury solely to members of protected groups. Instead, it imposes a normative result contrary to the
mission of the FHA to promote integration and reduce discrimination. Social
science research suggests that prejudiced communications can shape listener
norms and that these changes can ripple through social networks.

288. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
289. See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text.
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